



It now is widely recognized in the United States
that price stability is the most appropriate long-
term goal of monetary policy. Last year, Repre-
sentative Stephen Neal proposed that this goal
be recognized formally in legislation that would
instruct the Federal Reserve to lower the inflation
rate to zero within five years and maintain con-
stant prices thereafter. This proposal was en-
dorsed by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan and a number of Reserve Bank
Presidents (Parry 1990).
But in addition to the long-term goal of price
stability, the Fed also has the goal of averting or
minimizing the effects of downturns in economic
activity. These objectives call for differing, and
sometimes conflicting, policy actions, which
raises the issue of which should take precedence
at any particular time. Currently the Fed decides
this issue on a discretionary basis, responding
to a wide range of indicators of economic and
financial activity and of inflation.
Many economists argue that a discretionary
approach produces an inflationary bias in policy,
as the goal of price stability tends to be sacrificed
to short-term stabilization goals. These econo-
mists recommend abandoning discretion in favor
of a monetary policy rule that explicitly binds
policymakers to actions that stabilize prices. Pro-
ponents of discretion respond that, although rules
may enhance price stability, they would be likely
to involve unacceptably large losses of economic
output when inflation was being reduced or
when inflation shocks were encountered.
In this Letter, we assess the merits of a type
of policy rule that was designed to address the
concerns of both camps in this debate-ensuring
price stability while attempting to limit disrup-
tions of economic activity.
Targets
Choosing a policy target is the first step in
moving away from discretion and toward a rules-
based approach to monetary policy. Economists
disagree over which variable would be the most
effective target mainly because of differences in
their views ofthe structure of the economy.
Traditionally, the money supply has been
considered an appealing target because inflation
is caused by excessive monetary growth in the
long run. Moreover, the money stock is closely
related to the actions the central bank takes to
implement policy. These considerations were
instrumental in the Federal Reserve's decision
to establish target ranges for several monetary
aggregates beginning in the mid-1970s.
In the last decade, however, the relation
between the money supply, on the one hand,
and economic activity and prices, on the other,
has become unstable, and thus difficult to predict
in the short to intermediate run. This instability,
which apparently is related to the deregulation
of the financial system, has greatly limited the
usefulness of money as a target. As a result,
although the Fed still establishes monetary
ranges, they no longer play the key role in policy.
Problems with the stability of the monetary
aggregates have led to increased interest among
economists in nominal GNP as a policy target.
This variable measures the current dollar value of
economic output (in other words, real GNP times
the aggregate price level). Given this definition,
it would be easy to calculate the path of nominal
GNP that would be consistent with long-run
price stability, so long as real GNP had a pre-
dictable long-run trend.
However, there is some debate over whether real
GNP follows such a trend. Until the 1980s, it was
widely believed that real GNP did have a stable
trend that was determined by gradually evolving
movements in the labor force and productivity.
Recently, however, a number of researchers have
argued that real GNP does not have a stationary
trend, but rather is buffeted by technological and
labor supply shocks that permanently alter its
level. If this "real business cycle" view is correct,FRBSF
the price level could drift over time under nomi-
nal GNP targeting. Statistical tests cannot distin-
guish very well between these two hypotheses,
casting doubt on the effectiveness of nominal
GNP as a target in stabilizing prices.
In part because of this concern, some econo-
mists have argued that the Fed should target
prices directly. Regardless of how real GNP
behaves, direct price-level targeting could avoid
long-term price-level drift. But the effectiveness
of this target also is subject to debate, because of
differing views of the flexibility of prices. Propo-
nents of price-level targeting believe that prices
are relatively flexible-a critical feature of the
real business cycle theory.
Keynesian economists, on the other hand,
believe that prices are "sticky:' so that policy
has its principal immediate effects on output, and
only later affects prices. Hence, attempts by the
central bank to achieve a predetermined path for
prices might involve high short-run volatility in
output. Moreover, many of these economists
downplay the role of disruptions to an otherwise
stable trend in real GNP, and thus believe that
nominal GNP makes more sense as a target than
prices.
Operational rules
Even if the appropriate policy target were
readily apparent, such knowledge would not
suffice to establish a rules-based monetary
policy procedure. Most target variables cannot
be directly controlled by the central bank. Thus,
a policy rule also must be chosen that defines
the actions the central bank will take in response
to movements in the variable it targets. Those
actions are defined in terms of movements in
a variable called the policy instrument, which
must be under the direct control of the central
bank.
. McCallum (1988) has proposed specific mone-
tary policy rules that merit consideration. These
rules have nominal GNP or the price level as the
policy target, and the monetary base as the in-
strument. They are operational, in the sense that
they specify precisely how the central bank
should change the monetary base in response
to nominal GNP or the price level.
Another appealing feature of these rules is that
their implementation does not depend upon any
particular economic model. Thus they sidestep
the theoretical debates about the "right" struc-
ture of the economy. The rules involve adjusting
monetary policy to observed misses of a variable
from its target value, and do not depend upon
any forecast that wouId require a particular
macroeconomic model to be used.
In particular, these rules have two components.
First, they specify a long-run equilibrium growth
rate for the monetary base that is estimated to
be consistent with price stability. This compo-
nent allows the base to expand enough to ac-
commodate the (noninflationary) trend rate of
expansion of economic output (that is, in this
component, growth in the base is equal to
growth of potential GNP plus trend growth
of the velocity of the base).
Second, the rules specify responses to deviations
between the actual and desired values of the
target variable. For example, if nominal GNP is
above its target in any quarter, the nominal GNP
rule calls for the Fed to reduce the growth rate of
the monetary base by some fraction of the target
miss. The strength of this response could be
raised or lowered depending on howaggres-
sively the central bank wished to pursue its
target. Presumably, a more aggressive response
would tend to involve more precise control of the
target variable in the short run, but possibly with
more volatility in economic activity, while a more
gradual response would produce the opposite
result. Thus the McCallum rules can be tailored
to the objectives of the central bank. However,
even with a gradual response, the rules are dec
signed to ensure price stability in the long run.
The choice of the monetary base as the policy
instrument is controversial. The advantage of this
variable is that it can be accurately controlled by
the Fed. Moreover, data on it are widely availa-
ble, so that the public can easily observe the
central bank's adherenceto its rule, and thus
hold the central bank accountable for its actions.
The disadvantage of the ofthe base is that its
relationship to nominal GNP has been less stable
since the deregulation of the financial system.
Two features of the McCallum rules tend to
mitigate this problem. First, they include a
term that gradually adjusts the equilibrium
base growth rate for changes in the relationship
between the base and nominal GNP. Second,the structure of the rules ensures that changes in
that relationship automatically are offset by pol-
icy. For example, if nominal GNP rises above its
target because of an unexpected change in that
relationship, the rule will require the Fed to
reduce growth in the base until nominal GNP
is brought back on target. Instability in the base
could therefore cause temporary problems for
monetary policy, but eventually they would be
corrected under the rule.
Would the McCallum rules work?
Given the uncertainties about the structure of the
economy, it would be risky to adopt a rule unless
it were likely to work well in a variety of different
economic environments. Do McCallum's rules
satisfy this criterion? In a study for the Bank's
Economic Review (Judd and Motley 1991), we
analyzed this issue by conducting counterfactual
simulations of how the economy would have
evolved if the Fed had used the rul~s in the past.
We conducted these tests in the context of
several models that incorporated the various
features of the economy that are crucial for the
performance of alternative rules. Thus we tested
models with fixed prices, flexible prices, a sta-
tionary, and a nonstationary trend in real GNP.
To measure the uncertainty associated with using
the rules, we conducted repeated (stochastic)
simulations for each rule under alternative sets
of shocks, and constructed ranges of outcomes
(confidence intervals) for the economy.
We found that the nominal GNP rule was suc-
cessful at achieving price level targets in all of
the models tested. Moreover, that rule appears
capable of holding prices close to the target level
even in the face of the kinds of unexpected
developments typically experienced in the u.s.
economy. The price-level rule, by contrast, pro-
duced wide swings in real GNP and prices in the
model that assumed sticky prices. Given the un-
certainty about which model is most appropriate,
this result argues for nominal GNP, and against
prices, as the target.
Using the nominal GNP rule, we simulated the
possible effects of moving from the 4Yz percent
inflation rate in 1990 to zero inflation in 1995
as specified under the Neal Amendment. The
results suggest that this rule had a high chance
of success under all the models. Moreover, none
of the models suggested that the disinflationary
process would increase the probability of a
recession significantly compared with that
experienced over the past 35 years under actual
policy. Under the most likely outcome, annual
real GNP growth would not fall below 1Yz
percent.
We did find one problem with the nominal GNP
rule. It raised the short-run volatility of real GNP
relative to that observed under current discretion-
ary policies. However, it is important to bear in
mind that our estimates may represent upper
bounds on the detrimental effects on income
volatility of following the rule. Adopting a rule
should enhance Fed credibility, which would
reduce uncertainty in the economy and could
have beneficial effects on volatility.
Overall, the McCallum-type nominal GNP rule
shows promise as a way to eliminate inflation
without greatly increasing the chances of a re-
cession. The rule also could ensure price stability
thereafter, possibly at the expense of more volatil-
ity in real GNP. Whether this rule seems worth
trying depends on the importance placed on
achieving and maintaining zero inflation com-
pared with the risk that the economy would be
more volatile.
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